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Let me begin with a short remark concerning the figure of Eric Packer in Don DeLillo’s (2003)
Cosmopolis. In a certain way, he is not only an allegory of contemporary finance capitalism, of
its “arcane workings” and “data-driven fantasies” (Samman, 2015: 24), but also the fallen
angel of an illusion — the illusion that markets, and especially financial markets, tend towards
equilibrium; that they assure a perfect allocation of resources and the best possible
distribution of information; and finally, that they create a sort of social order. This illusion
represents the kernel of liberal market theories since Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’, and still
characterizes what economists have named the ‘efficient market hypothesis’.
This theoretical setting — which has been further developed since the 1970s and became
dominant or hegemonic in the field of financial economics — holds (to put it very briefly) that it
is financial markets that depict market activity in their most beautiful purity. Unburdened by
transaction costs, unencumbered by transport considerations and by the tribulations of
production, they are the ideal stages for pricing mechanisms and perfect competition to
perform their magic. This means, first, that ideal conditions for competition reign in these
markets and that all information (about companies, stocks, economic development, and so
on) is equally accessible to all players. Second, this implies that all prices (for stocks, options,
derivatives) in these markets exhaustively contain or reflect all available information. Third, in
these prices (and in the buying decisions connected to them), rational and fully plausible
expectations are expressed — i.e., there should be relative agreement about the profit
expectations connected to this or that financial instrument. Finally — and this is the most
important point — new (and previously unknown) information is at once used and integrated
under these conditions, which is to say that all unpredictabilities are immediately absorbed by
the market, and that the whole system always heads towards a balance, towards an
equilibrium.
This is indeed the most prominent theory for the functioning of modern financial markets,
and economists have continuously raved about the ‘beauty’ of this theory, the beauty of
equilibrium in markets. For this theory also contains a perfect justification: the more players
with more funds who participate in these markets, the more the financial markets expand, and
therewith, the more stability will be produced. At the center of financial-economic knowledge
thus lies a promise of order of a very special kind. We may be justified, then, in recognizing a
legacy of the older doctrines of theodicy in the modern conception of financial markets. I
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Just as, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, theodicy — as promulgated, for
example, by Leibniz (1985/1710) — attempted to justify the rational and providential workings
of God in a world full of plagues and disasters, so the liberal theory of financial markets also
claims that, despite all breakdowns, bankruptcies, and crashes, today’s financial economy is
the best of all possible economic worlds. At the center of modern economic dogma thus exists
something that could be called oikodicy — a justificatory doctrine for all the evil and all the
catastrophes that appear irreconcilable with the wise establishment of the system. The
success of this doctrine lies not only in the fact that complex social processes are reduced to
quite simple operations, such as acts of exchange. It is also embodied in a fundamental figure
of hope, which today still remains connected to financial markets: that the market is the
privileged location of social order; that it is distinguished as the exponent of practical reason;
that, in the figure of the market, the old divine providence is taken over by the regularities of
the system. Economic theory is not vaguely realistic here, but rather deeply moralistic,
metaphysical, and — here I refer to Martijn Konings’ (2015) book — theological. This raises the
question of whether the latest financial crisis couldn’t have a similar effect as the Lisbon
Earthquake of 1755. The attempts at theodicy during that time were fundamentally shaken
and could only survive in satirical forms, like in Voltaire’s Candide (2006/1759).
I would thus like to bring my remarks to a point: mainstream economics must be
conceived of as a sort of ‘dangerous’ knowledge — because its models (like the idea of
efficient markets) offer no explanation for the regularity of crises and crashes in financial
markets in the last decades; and because these models were also employed in the
implementation and justification of these very markets. Just as the Lisbon earthquake of 1755
once shook modern theodicy to its foundations, so the financial tremors of the last twenty
years threaten to undermine the scientific status of economic theory. What is at issue is
nothing less than the validity, possibility, and tenability of a liberal or capitalist oikodicy, a
theodicy of the economic universe. It is likely that we are dealing here with one of the greatest
and most fatal of errors of modern economics.
But time and again there were advocates of the devil who doubted that markets — and
financial markets in particular — tend towards balance, that figures of social order actualize
themselves in markets, that markets are determined by beautiful regularities, or that markets
promote societal welfare at all. It is not surprising, then, that at the perimeter of the last crisis
an American economist who attempted to develop a completely divergent theory of financial
markets, and whose voice had been ignored in the economic doctrines of the last forty years,
was rediscovered. In his hypothesis about financial instability, Hyman P. Minksy, a disciple of
Keynes, followed the intuition that the tumult of financial markets cannot simply be
assimilated by the balancing interaction of rational actors and systemic reason, or by the
delightful mechanisms of equilibrium. Crises and crashes, according to Minsky, are not the
exception but the rule in the financial-capitalist system. Financial markets, according to
Minsky’s (1986) ‘financial instability hypothesis’, function neither rationally nor irrationally.
They deal with time-critical uncertainties and risks, and are distinguished through a dynamic in
which rational (that is, profit-oriented) models lead to unforeseeable storms of events and
incalculable systemic risks.
Against this backdrop, all of the authors in this forum — despite their diverse perspectives
and approaches — are in agreement that an analysis of money and finance must rid itself of a
fixation upon the market system. In this they join Sombart (1969/1902), Weber (2011/1904),
and Braudel (1973/1967), who conceived of capitalism not just as an economic system, but
as a heterogeneous fabric consisting of business practices, mentalities, manners of conduct,
institutions, and social relations — in short, as a socio-cultural phenomenon.
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This line of thinking represents a critique of liberal orthodoxy, and its ahistorical character
in particular. Today, though, it also registers an attempt to avoid the implicit monetarism that
characterizes mainstream conceptions and theories of money. Besides the fact that it is
debatable whether the rise of money as a means of payment can be reduced to its function as
a medium of exchange or as a measure of liabilities (cf. Graeber, 2011), the financial economy
today is confronted by a lack of clarity in its definitions of money and currency. It is also
confronted by a multiplication of money-forms that include all possible kinds of ‘near moneys’
(such as assets or derivatives), in addition to cash, bank, check, deposit, and credit money. “To
label something as ‘money’”, a central banker once said, “is to build on shifting ground”
(Sayers, 1982/1957: 5).
It is therefore only logical to avoid economic definitions of currency and money and to
instead focus on the social and cultural effects of money, as Martijn Konings (2015) and
Noam Yuran (2015) have done. The most important aspects concern the agency of those
fetishisms, beliefs, faiths, and emotional or affective charges through which a circulation of
money has become the motor of a dominant social desiring-machine. This includes those
functions in which money itself creates a specific social bond, such as with our participation in
communities of consumers. It is no surprise, then, that since the institution of public credit
through the Bank of England at the end of the seventeenth century, the circulation of bank
notes, debts, and credit could be conceived of as a kind of social contract — as the “great
social bond of obligation and faith” (Müller, 1816: 89, my translation).
This also implies that the ‘economic’ or ‘financial’ spheres cannot be understood as
autonomous and independent. On the one hand, this concerns the origin and status of
economic knowledge as such. Mike Hill and Warren Montag (2015) provide us with an
alternative perspective on Adam Smith by pointing out the close entanglement between his
notion of the market and moral philosophy, anthropological concerns, and political theory, as
well as aesthetics and literary criticism. If we go one step further and take Foucault’s
(2008/2004) studies on ‘governmentality’ into consideration, we could then ask about the link
between the emergence of political economy and the economization of government, as well as
the reinvention of governance per se. Precisely because economic knowledge developed as a
specific knowledge of governance, the usual oppositions between state and market or political
and economic systems do not suffice to fully describe or comprehend their workings.
This becomes especially obvious in the case of finance. Early modern states already
purposely involved private financiers in executing governmental power, and the example of the
foundation of modern financial institutions, such as central banks, demonstrates how crucial
financial forces and actors were able to install themselves as the ‘fourth power’ of governance.
This is still the case. Since the 1970s, even processes of financialization emerged from a close
cooperation — or more precisely, symbiosis — between state bodies, international
organizations, private companies, and financial markets (see Vogl, 2015b).
The opposition of state and market, of political structures and economic dynamics, is
therefore at best a liberal legend — a legend that likely originated in the battle of liberalism
against feudal and absolutist dependencies, and which functioned as a polemical narrative in
the struggle for individual freedoms and civil emancipation. This battle was no doubt justified.
The opposition between state and market, however, obscures our view of concrete power
relations in ‘democratic capitalism’. In contrast one should focus on the functioning of a
bipolar governance machine, in which politics and economy consistently act on and interact
with one another. The practice of governance can today only be grasped as a politico-economic
complex, which forms itself in a series of continual transitions, alliances, fluctuations, and
mutual reinforcements between both poles. Our economic system and our financial system
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thus appear to require a stereoscopic perspective that pursues the co-evolution of states and
markets, of political structures and economic dynamics. I would like to propose this as a
challenge for a realistic political — and economic — theory: the question of how the
organization of power is entangled with the production and circulation of values.
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